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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellee does not object to appellant's Statement of Issues and Standard of 
Review A and B. Appellee submits that Issue C is more properly worded as: 
Issue: Was the trial court's failure to admit a witness's testimony under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 803(1), (2) an abuse of discretion, and, if so, was the 
failure to admit the testimony reversible error? 
Standard of review: Appellant properly states the standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409 (1953, as amended). Theft of Services, acts constituting. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available 
only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid 
the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of 
another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or 
to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional 
service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, 
rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or 
trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to 
entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable 
television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of 
deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services 
are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 
1 
through 76-6-409.9. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (1953, as amended). Interference with Arresting Officer, acts 
constituting. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to 
effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest 
or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803 (1), (2). Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the 
declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates 
to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant (hereinafter "defendant") was cited for Theft of Services and Inference 
by police officers employed by Utah Valley State College on January 28, 2005. R. at 1. 
He was subsequently charged by criminal information with the same charges. R. at 2. On 
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October 27, 2005, a jury convicted defendant of both charges. R. at 79, 80. He was 
sentenced November 8, 2005. R. at 105-107. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on 
November 10, 2005. R. at 108, 109. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 28, 2005, the Utah High School Association was holding its drill team 
competition ("the event") at the McKay Events Center (uthe Center")located on the Utah 
Valley State College campus ("UVSC"). Spectators wishing to enter the Center had to 
pay an admission fee. T. 15, 68. Signage directed patrons where to purchase tickets. T. 
17, 18, 192, 193. Events staff were employed to take tickets and monitor the event. 
Defendant's daughter was a participant in the event. T. 136. 
Wendy Fletcher ("Fletcher") and Cynthia Uda ("Uda") were UVSC employees 
working the event. Fletcher worked as the guest service supervisor T. 14. and Uda was 
taking tickets at the entrance to the event. T. 68. The Center has an exterior set of glass 
doors, a vestibule, and then a second set of solid doors that lead to the concourse and 
arena. T. 16,24,25. Ticket takers were just inside the exterior set of doors. 
At approximately 1:00 p.m. defendant entered the Center through the northwest 
entrance where event staff were taking tickets. Rather than present a ticket or a stamp 
showing he had previously been admitted to the event, he passed by the ticket takers. 
Fletcher asked him if he had a ticket or a stamp, to which defendant replied he did not. T. 
19, 68, 140, 154. Fletcher then told defendant he needed a ticket to be in the building. T. 
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20, 69, 77, 140. Defendant replied he had to get money from his wife. T. 20, 141. The 
conversation between Fletcher and defendant occurred as defendant had passed the ticket 
takers and was walking into the main portion of the Center. T. 20, 140, 164. 
The two of them stopped at the entrance to the arena portion of the building near 
the first row of seats. T. 21, 22, 141,142. Defendant was on his cell phone. T. 22, 141. 
While defendant was on the phone, Fletcher called security because defendant had 
entered the Center without a ticket. T. 22. Defendant finished his call and turned around 
and started back towards the entrance through which he had entered the building. T. 23, 
142. The two of them stopped in the vestibule between the interior and exterior doors. T. 
37, 144, 158. 
Two UVSC officers ("the officers"), Justin Sprague ("Officer Sprague") and Sgt. 
Cory Smith ("Sgt. Smith"), approached defendant from behind as he and Fletcher had 
reached the exterior set of doors. T. 144. Officer Sprague has been a UVSC officer for 
approximately four years. T. 82. Sgt. Smith has been a police officer for over fourteen 
years and has attained the rank of sergeant with UVSC. Both officers had experience 
working public events at the Center. T. 43, 84. Both officers were working the event and 
were in full police uniform, including a badge, radio, and sidearm. T. 52, 84. 
The officers responded to Fletcher's request that security respond to the Center's 
entrance because there was an individual who had entered the Center without a ticket and 
was being uncooperative. T. 44, 58, 85. Officer Sprague and Sgt. Smith responded to 
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Fletcher's location in under two minutes. T. 84. They saw Fletcher and defendant 
arguing. T. 86. Defendant was agitated. T. 71, 72. He did not think he needed a ticket 
to enter the Center for a short period of time. T. 72. 
Officer Sprague spoke with defendant while Sgt. Smith took Fletcher aside to get 
her side of the story. T. 26. Sgt. Smith and Fletcher stood anywhere from eight feet to 
fifteen or twenty feet away from Officer Sprague and defendant. T. 26, 46. Sgt. Smith 
positioned himself behind defendant so he could speak with Fletcher but make eye 
contact with Sprague. T. 47. Both Fletcher and Sgt. Smith could hear parts of the 
conversation between Officer Sprague and defendant. T. 27, 47, 48. Uda could also hear 
the conversation. T. 70-72. From Sgt. Smith's vantage point he could see the position of 
defendant's hands and whether they were in his pockets. T. 48. 
Officer Sprague asked defendant how he was doing? T. 26, 85. Defendant said he 
was doing fine. T. 26, 84. Officer Sprague asked defendant what was going on? T. 86. 
Defendant replied he was there to get some money from his wife to get a ticket. T. 86, 
97. Officer Sprague said that was fine and that the two of them would wait for 
defendant's wife to arrive. T. 87. 
Officer Sprague continued to speak with defendant. He noticed defendant's hands 
were in his pockets. T. 87. For officer safety, Officer Sprague asked defendant three 
times to remove his hands from his pockets. T. 87, 88. After the first request, defendant 
did take his hands out but then put them back in his pockets. Officer Sprague asked 
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defendant a second time to remove his hands from his pockets. Defendant failed to 
comply. T. 27, 71, 79, 87, 88. After the third request, defendant removed his hands from 
his pockets, but kept his hands to his sides with balled fists and stared at Officer Sprague. 
T. 88. 
Sgt. Smith noticed defendant's actions with his hands. T. 48. Sgt. Smith noticed 
defendant's hand placement because of officer safety issues. When an officer can't see a 
suspect's hands, there is a potential for a suspect to hurt an officer. T. 48. Sgt. Smith 
moved closer to Officer Sprague and defendant and heard Officer Sprague issue 
commands for defendant to keep his hands in view. T. 49. Sgt. Smith recalls Officer 
Sprague issuing the command at least twice. T. 49. Sgt. Smith also heard Officer Sprague 
ask defendant to show some identification at least twice. T.49. 
As Officer Sprague's back up officer, Sgt. Smith noticed defendant's posture and 
demeanor. T. 50. Sgt. Smith noticed defendant was agitated and defensive. Defendant 
tensed his body and clenched his fist. T. 50, 51. Sgt. Smith signaled to Officer Sprague 
to watch defendant. Officer Sprague signaled back he was seeing the same things. T. 51. 
Because of defendant's failure to comply, Officer Sprague heightened his safety 
alert. Officer Sprague asked defendant three times for his driver license. Defendant 
failed to produce it. T. 29, 89, 145, 160. During Officer Sprague's conversation with 
defendant, Officer Sprague and Sgt. Smith kept eye contact with each other. T. 90. Sgt. 
Smith and Officer Sprague exchanged hand signals regarding the fact defendant had his 
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hands in his pockets. T. 90. 
Sgt. Smith, who had been speaking with Fletcher, walked over to Officer Sprague 
and defendant. T. 90. Fearing the situation between Officer Sprague and defendant was 
escalating Sgt. Smith grabbed defendant by his right arm while Officer Sprague grabbed 
defendant's left arm. T. 51, 91. Defendant pulled away from Sgt. Smith's grasp. T. 53. 
Sgt. Smith told defendant to stop. T. 30, 53, 79. When defendant failed to stop pulling 
away, Sgt. Smith took his arm in a reverse wrist lock. T. 53. All three men ended up 
going to the ground as the officers attempted to control defendant. T. 30, 91. 
While all three men were on the ground, both officers issued commands to 
defendant to stop fighting and to allow officers to control his hands. T. 55, 91. After 
several attempts to control defendant, Officer Sprague deployed his Taser and applied 
three contact stuns to defendant. T. 55, 92. Each time Officer Sprague issued commands 
for defendant to stop fighting. T. 63, 92. After receiving three stuns, defendant stopped 
struggling and complied with the officers' commands. T. 31, 56, 73, 92. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to properly marshal the evidence and under Rule 24 his brief 
should be struck. However, in the alternative, there was sufficient evidence to convict 
defendant of Theft of Services as the jury heard ample evidence he committed an illegal 
act with the requisite mental state. The court properly instructed the jury by refusing to 
give an overbroad instruction. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing to admit hearsay evidence. Even if it did, defendant was not harmed in that he 
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was able to admit similar testimony through several other witnesses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, AND HIS 
BRIEF IS THEREFORE PROCEDURALLY INADEQUATE 
A. Rule 24 and the marshaling requirement 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states that "[a] party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." Case law clearly expresses two distinct purposes. First, appellate 
courts are deemed competent to judge the weight of the evidence, or lack thereof, under 
conditions where the findings based thereon are clearly erroneous; thus, rule 24 
incorporates a procedural mechanism to protect the fact-finding prerogative of the trial 
courts. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of Fact. . . shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses.") See also State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah 
App. 1990) ('The process of marshaling the evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at 
trial.") 
By requiring an appellant to catalogue the evidence 
supporting the trial court's decision, the marshaling 
requirement thus acts as a clear reminder that appellants 
should not try to persuade the appellate court that their theory 
of the case was stronger than that which was advanced by the 
other side, or that their evidence and witnesses were more 
compelling; instead, the marshaling requirement reminds us 
that appellate review of a factual determination is strictly 
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confined to an analysis as to whether there was sufficient 
evidence to support the particular factual conclusion that was 
actually reached below. 
Ryan D. Tenney, The Utah Marshaling Requirement: An Overview, 17 Utah Bar J. 6, 22. 
Second, the marshaling requirement serves a more practical purpose: 
Trial courts are gradually exposed to the facts of a case 
through both the pretrial motion process and through the 
presentation of the parties' evidence and witnesses at trial. In 
contrast, an appellate court's exposure to the facts of a case 
only comes through reference to the record. Absent effective 
briefing, an appellate court that is reviewing a factual 
challenge would be forced to wade through hundreds and 
perhaps thousands of pages in the record in order to gain an 
accurate sense of how much evidence supported a particular 
finding. Such a process would . . . create the very real risk 
that an appellate court, starting from scratch, might 
inadvertently overlook a piece of relevant evidence. To help 
avoid such a result, the marshaling requirement places the 
onerous burden of conducting this research on the party who 
should by disposition be most familiar with the quantum of 
evidence (or putative lack thereof) that supports the 
challenged finding. 
Id See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 491 (Utah App. 1992). 
An appellant must meet two requirements to satisfy rule 24fs marshaling 
requirement. First, rule 24(a) explicitly states that the marshaled evidence must be 
contained in the opening briefs argument section: 
The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
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issues presented . . . . A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (emphasis added) (italics in original). Several reported cases have 
stricken briefs as inadequate under rule 24 for failure to follow the placement rule. See, 
e.g. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah App. 1987) ("[Appellant's] brief 
contains a heading 'FACTS' under which appellant has set forth both parties' 'versions' 
of the facts. This does not constitute a sufficient marshaling of the evidence . . . . The 
requisite presentation of supporting evidence is also not found in the argument portion of 
appellant's brief. Appellant has, therefore, failed to meet his threshold burden on appeal, 
one that is neither elective nor optional.") See also Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, J^47 
n.l 1, 54 P.3d 1119 (stating "[t]hough Castleton did mention some evidence favorable to 
the court's finding, he generally dispersed this evidence throughout his appellate brief. 
To comply with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable 
evidence at the point at which they challenge the factual finding") (emphasis added); 
Roderick v. Ricks. 2002 UT 84, f47 n.l 1, 54 P.3d 1119 (ruling appellant's brief 
inadequate for, inter alia, including marshaled evidence in appendix). 
Second, rule 24 imposes a strict duty of thoroughness if an appellant is to meet the 
"threshold burden." Fitzgerald, 744 P.2d at 304. Rule 24(a)(9) states that a party 
challenging a fact finding "must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding." 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's 
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advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the 
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. ]n 
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the 
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal 
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Vallev City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991) (emphasis 
in original). 
In summary of the marshaling requirement, an appellant's relative degree of 
procedural compliance to the marshaling requirement will substantively affect the merit 
of his appellate claim. It is analytically impossible to substantively show clear error 
without perfect compliance to the procedural duty to marshal the evidence. The 
procedural requirements provide the only available analytic framework within which to 
show clear error. 
B. Defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden 
In this case, defendant has failed in every possible respect regarding his rule 
24(a)(9) and requirements and the duty to marshal. First, defendant purports to marshal 
the evidence in the facts section of his opening brief Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5, 
6. This placement, of itself, requires the Court of Appeals to strike defendant's brief as 
inadequate. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Fitzgerald. 744 P.2d at 304; Roderick. 2002 
UT 84, |^47 n.l 1. The argument section of defendant's brief purporting to challenge the 
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jury verdict as resting on insufficient evidence does nothing more than to give a few lines 
of contrary evidentiary argument. It does not "present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists." West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315. Rather, the analysis 
portion of defendant's factual challenge simply refers the Court to defendant's earlier 
statement of the facts. He assumes that his global recitation of the facts in an earlier 
section satisfies the procedural requirement to marshal the evidence. As above-cited case 
law makes clear, however, "appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at the 
point at which they challenge the factual finding." Roderick, 2002 UT 84, ^ {47 n. 11. This 
is more than mere formalism, because it requires a level of analytic discipline designed to 
reflect the relatively difficult clearly erroneous standard of review. Defendant's brief is 
inadequate in this regard. 
Defendant's brief further fails to satisfy the marshaling requirement in that it does 
not strictly catalogue the evidence supporting the challenged jury finding of guilt. While 
the appellate courts have not, as of yet, imposed a particular format for cataloguing the 
marshaled evidence, the cases are clear that the appellant must "present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 
1315. Because one of the central purposes of the marshaling requirement is to place the 
burden of research upon the person challenging the findings, an appellate court cannot 
countenance a brief that merely summarizes or reviews in broad terms the evidence 
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adduced at trial. The marshaling requirement is satisfied only by an utter and complete 
compilation of uevery scrap of competent evidence." Id. 
Defendant's brief, however, has discussed the evidence only in the broadest terms, 
and has not given appropriate deference to the jury verdict. See, e ^ State v. Colwell 200 
UT 8, J^42, 994 P. 2d 177 (stating the Court will not lightly overturn a jury verdict). Mere 
recharacterization of the evidence, much the same way an attorney might do in closing 
argument to the jury, falls woefully short of the high burden to marshal and show clear 
error on appeal. For reasons discussed below, even if defendant had followed his 
procedural requirements in this regard, he still could not show clear error because the jury 
did, in fact, have sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty. The point here is that 
defendant's stark procedural failure prevents this Court from even considering his 
substantive evidentiary argument. For this reason alone, defendant's brief should be 
deemed inadequate under rule 24 and stricken. 
II. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT DEFENDANT OF 
THEFT OF SERVICES 
The City hereby incorporates its marshaling argument from above. However, if 
the Court holds that defendant has adequately marshaled the evidence, Ihe City argues 
that the Court should affirm the jury's guilty verdict regarding the Theft of Services 
charge. Defendant has not met the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict. An 
appellate court will not lightly overturn a jury verdict. See Colwell at ^42. Defendant has 
the burden of showing "the evidence at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could 
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not have reached the verdict. 14 at 1J42. The appellate court looks at the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. Id at ^42. uWhen findings of all required elements of 
the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence, including the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it, we stop our inquiry and sustain the verdict." Id at [^42. 
A. Defendant obtained services to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code §76-6-409 
Defendant argues that, because he was never allowed to enter the arena area to 
view the competition, he never met the receipt of services element of U.C.A. §76-6-409. 
The service being offered by the Center was entry into the building. Defendant was 
approached by Fletcher after he had entered the Center through the unchecked door, but 
before he could watch the competition. T. 19, 68, 140, 154. By passing the threshold of 
the Center without paying, defendant wrongfully placed himself in the position held for 
ticket holders; i.e., the ability to enter the public areas of the arena. The fact that he was 
caught before he could watch his daughter is immaterial. The service that a ticket holder 
received was admission to the Center. A ticket holder could choose to watch the 
competition or just walk around the concourse and enjoy the Center's food vendors. 
Defendant unlawfully acquired the services offered by the Center by entering the Center 
without a valid ticket or stamp. 
B. Defendant's actions established de facto proof of his intent to receive services by 
other means designed to avoid the payment for them 
The jury heard evidence from which they could conclude defendant had the 
requisite intent to obtain services without paying for them. People entering the Center 
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were required to pay admission before entry. T. 16, 58. Defendant entered the Center 
without a ticket. T. 19, 68, 140, 154. Fletcher informed him he needed a ticket to enter 
the Center. T. 20, 69, 77, 144. Defendant ignored Fletcher and continued into the 
Center. T. 20, 140, 164. Because defendant entered the Center without a ticket, ignored 
the request to produce evidence of payment, and then continued on into the Center, the 
jury could reasonably infer that defendant had the requisite intent to obtain services he 
knows are available only for compensation by means designed to avoid the due payment 
for them. U.C.A. §76-6-409. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is a question of law that the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. See State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, ]fl 1, 62 
P.3d 444. In support of his argument that the trial court improperly instructed the jury, 
defendant cites State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985). The State argues the holding 
in Leonard is narrow and can be distinguished from the facts of the present case. 
In Leonard , Mr. Leonard checked into a Salt Lake City hotel. Id. at 652. He 
signed the guest registration card and paid for his first night's lodging in cash. Li The 
next day he paid for his second night's lodging. RL He failed to pay for his next three 
night's lodging, at which time the manager locked him out of his room for failing to pay 
his bill. LdL After being locked out, Mr. Leonard went to the front desk and promised to 
pay his arrearage, and the manager let him back in his room. Id The next day the 
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manager contacted defendant to pay his bill. 14 Rather than pay, Mr. Leonard vacated 
the room and left without paying his balance. Id, 
The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Leonard is limited for two reasons. The first 
is the type of services rendered are those in which a person could, in good faith, receive 
the service and intend to pay later. Mr. Leonard signed the guest registry and paid for two 
nights of his stay. It is common practice for hotels to take a deposit and then settle the 
bill after the services have been rendered. 
The second is that the Court relied on contract theory. The Court stated 
"The rule is that a person who in good faith accepts the benefits of services 
for which he plans to pay later cannot be convicted of theft even though he 
subsequently does not recompense the provider of services. The remedy in 
such a case is a civil suit for breach of contract. " 
Leonard at 654 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Leonard and the hotel had entered a contract for services, the remedy for 
breach thereof is a civil suit. The Court properly stated that people can no longer be put 
in prison for failing to pay a debt. See Leonard at 654. Thus, under a contract theory of 
the transaction between Mr. Leonard and the hotel, the State would have to show more 
than just the fact Mr. Leonard failed to pay. There has to be intent, otherwise it is just a 
breach of contract case. See Leonard at 655. 
The present case may be distinguished from Leonard. Here the services offered by 
the Center are not of the type one normally partakes of based on a promise to pay in the 
future. A person must universally purchase a ticket in order to enter the Center. There 
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can be no future promise to pay. The situation is analogous to a merchant who offers 
items for sale. Utah law, like that of other jurisdictions, recognizes that the illegitimate 
possession of property, with the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the owner's rights 
to that property, constitutes theft. See State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980). In 
cases of theft of chattel property, courts have long recognized that theft is completed at 
the time of asportation. See State v. Bender. 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978). Where store 
security stopped a man who was attempting to surreptitiously remove a coat from a 
clothing store, the court held that the theft was completed when the man hid the coat in a 
bag without paying, even though he was stopped before he could leave the store. See id. 
at 1021. 
In this case, defendant received services (entrance to the Center during the 
competition) where payment was required before entering the building. Defendant argues 
that the instructions he proposed were applicable to all cases of theft of services, but the 
Utah Supreme Court clearly intended the ruling to apply to a more narrow range of cases. 
The trial court correctly denied a proposed jury instruction that gave an inappropriately 
broad statement of the law. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ADMIT HEARSAY TESTIMONY IS 
NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
Though not directly stated, defendant's third argument is as follows: had the trial 
court admitted the proffered hearsay testimony the trial's outcome on the count of 
Interference would have been different. The proffered testimony was that an unidentified 
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bystander to the struggle between the officers and defendant stated 'The guy did not do 
anything wrong. At first I saw them frisk his pockets. Then the next thing I knew, they 
were jumping on him. He didn't resist, talk back or anything." T. 170, 171. Defendant 
claims that had this testimony been allowed, defendant could have refuted the State's 
witnesses. 
A trial judge has broad discretion to admit or not admit evidence. See Colwell, 
2000 UT 8, TJ26. Where a trial court has excluded evidence, the appellate court reviews 
the decision for abuse of discretion and, where discretion was abused, for harmless error. 
Id }^26. Reversal is warranted only if 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been 
a more favorable result for the defendant. A reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome exists when the appellate court's confidence in the 
verdict actually reached is undermined. 
State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35,1[17, 999 P.2d 7. See also Colwell 2000 UT 8, ]f26. 
Furthermore, if the substance of the excluded evidence is admitted through other means, 
there is no error. Id [^29. The State contends the court's refusal to allow the proffered 
testimony was harmless error because other defense witnesses offered testimony similar 
to that which was excluded. There is ample evidence upon which the jury convicted 
defendant of Interference. 
Addressing the harmless error analysis in reverse order, any error was cured 
because the substance of the excluded proffered testimony was introduced by other 
witnesses. Tracy Gillman ("Gillman") testified she first became aware of the physical 
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nature of the encounter between the officers and defendant when she heard a huge thud 
and turned around to see where the noise was coming from. T. 169. She testified she had 
not heard any sounds of an altercation before hearing the thud. T. 169. Nor was she 
aware of what had transpired prior to hearing the sound of the officers and defendant 
going down to the floor. T. 177. Once her attention was focused on the officers and 
defendant on the floor, she testified defendant was not combative as the officers were 
trying to control his arms. T. 174. 
Similarly, defense witness Brad Ashton ("Ashton") testified he saw the officers 
speaking with defendant. T. 121. He did not hear any yelling or screaming between the 
parties. T. 121. He witnessed the officers take defendant down to the floor. T. 121. 
Ashton thought the scene was "weird" because there was not any yelling or screaming. T. 
122. Ashton testified defendant did not fight the officers once he was on the ground. T. 
124. Like Gillman, Ashton was not aware of what had transpired between the officers 
and defendant prior to the takedown. T. 122, 126. 
Defense witness Joyce Backus testified essentially the same as Gillman and 
Ashton - that she first became aware of the officers and defendant when the detention 
became physical. T. 132. She did not hear any yelling prior to the takedown. T. 133. 
Finally, defendant's own testimony was that he had done nothing to provoke the 
physical altercation. He was standing with Sprague when he felt his arm being grabbed 
and then falling to the ground. T. 146. The officers then "tased" him and handcuffed 
him. T. 147. Defendant denied yelling at the officers, fighting or striking them. T. 147. 
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Four defense witnesses, including defendant, testified defendant had not done 
anything to initiate the physical altercation between the officers and defendant. These 
same witnesses also said he did not struggle while on the ground. This testimony is the 
same as the proffered testimony the court refused to admit. Defendant cannot say he was 
prejudiced by the refusal to admit the proffered testimony when he was able to introduce 
the same information. Defendant was not harmed by the exclusion. Any error had been 
cured. See Colwell at T}29. 
Confidence in the jury's verdict has not been undermined by excluding the 
proffered testimony. For reasons already stated, the jury had the same evidence 
introduced to it through other witnesses. Indeed, defendant himself offered the same 
testimony. One cannot argue there would have been a different outcome had the 
proffered testimony been introduced. 
Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the proffered 
testimony. Defendant offers two alternative bases for admitting the testimony - as an 
excited utterance or a present sense impression under Rule of Evidence 803. In State v. 
AUred, 2002 UT App 291, 55 P.3d 1158, this court stated, "Exceptions to the hearsay rule 
are based on factors that provide assurances of testimonial reliability sufficient to 
dispense with the usual means of purging testimony of error and falsehood." IcL at f^22 
(quoting State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995)). 
Allred was a case where officers were speaking to a group of people at Liberty 
Park. Allred at ^2. The officers located a suspicious black bag containing contraband 
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and sought to identify its owner. IcL at ^|2, 3. Nobody wanted to claim ownership of the 
bag. Id at }^3. The officers concocted a plan implying that an aggressive canine or a 
more subdued bloodhound could be brought to the scene to sniff out ownership of the 
bag. Id Defendant Allred blurted out he owned the bag. Id at ][4. At trial, Allred sought 
to introduce a statement purporting to having been made by a person, "Clay", not present 
when the officers were questioning the group and who, while upset the police had 
searched his bag, claimed ownership of the bag. Id [^6. 
The Court held a party wishing to admit evidence under rule 803 must still lay a 
foundation regarding the reliability of the declarant. Id at f22. Issues such as the 
declarant's age, physical and mental condition, the nature of the startling event, the 
subject matter of the statement, and time factors all play an important role in assessing a 
declarant's state of mind. Id at [^22. The Court refused to allow the testimony because 
there was not enough information about "Clay" to provide assurances of reliability. Id at 
122. 
While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly why the court refused to admit the 
evidence, the court had an issue with the lack of foundation as to who the declarant was. 
T. 170. The only information defendant proffered about the declarant was that it was a 
woman who was standing in the crowd and that she is describing events that have 
happened as her statement is in the past tense. T. 170, 171. Defendant's proffer did not 
include any other foundational details. Without adequate foundational details the court 
acted properly in excluding the testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments the Court should uphold defendant's 
convictions for Theft of Services and Interference. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of July, 2006 
Michael G. Barker 
Orem City Prosecutor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellee's Brief, postage prepaid, this 12th day of July, 2006, to the following: 
STEPHEN QUESENBERRY (8073) 
D. SCOTT DAVIS (8934) 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
3319 North University Avenue 
Provo, UT 84604 
22 
